SELUTH Red Team · Track 3 · Adversarial White Hat Recovery
OPERATION
BAD00000
Active Criminal Phishing Network · Ethereum Mainnet · EIP-7702 Exploitation
85,445+
Total Transactions
55 days
Active Operation
~6.6M
USDT + USDC Targets
LIVE
Crack Running

I. Executive Summary

An active, automated phishing network operating on Ethereum mainnet has been identified, mapped, and documented. The operation uses EIP-7702 authorization delegation combined with dust airdrop bait to drain real assets from victims who interact with fake token distributions.

The operator wallet 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 — a Profanity-style vanity address — fires against a custom phishing contract every 90 seconds. The contract has executed over 85,000 transactions across 55 days, targeting millions of wallet addresses with small USDC, USDT, LINK, and WBTC amounts to bait interaction.

This report presents the full evidence package: network topology, attack mechanics, on-chain data, scale analysis, vulnerability assessment of the operator key, and active crack status.

Documented 2026-06-05
Evidence: Etherscan + Dune Analytics
Crack: PM2 77 · Active

II. Network Topology

Fake_Phishing2738523 <— unknown root funder └── 0.001 ETH seed ──→ Fake_Phishing2738522 <— 0x38a4610d346b7f63319bc054f22f606317d3fc59 ├── deployed ──────→ Fake_Phishing2738521 <— 0xbbbbb...bbbbb PHISHING CONTRACT └── funded ────────→ Fake_Phishing2738812 <— 0xbad00000...1472 OPERATOR ← CRACK TARGET └── calls bbbbb every ~90s ──→ dust airdrop → drain
RoleAddressLabelNotes
Root Funder unknown Fake_Phishing2738523 Seeded deployer with 0.001 ETH
Deployer / Funder 0x38a4610d346b7f63319bc054f22f606317d3fc59 Fake_Phishing2738522 Deployed phishing contract + funded operator
Phishing Contract 0xbbbbb048b1a85ca221058c45525095b6a68bbbbb Fake_Phishing2738521 778 bytes, unverified, obfuscated. allowedCaller() returns operator. Flagged: HashDit.
Operator (EOA) 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 Fake_Phishing2738812 5.28 ETH gas reserve. Vanity prefix. Nonce 85,440+. Crack target.

III. Attack Mechanics

The EIP-7702 Dust Airdrop Pattern

Step 1
Dust Airdrop. The bbbbb contract distributes tiny amounts of USDC, USDT, WBTC, LINK, and DAI to thousands of addresses simultaneously. Amounts are small enough to appear as an unclaimed airdrop or reward.
Step 2
Victim Discovery. Recipients see unexpected tokens in their wallet. Curiosity drives them to investigate — checking Etherscan, clicking links in the transaction data, or attempting to claim via a phishing site linked from the token.
Step 3
Authorization Request. Victim is prompted to sign an EIP-7702 authorization, granting the bbbbb contract delegation rights over their EOA. The UI is designed to look like a legitimate approval.
Step 4
Drain. Once delegated, the phishing contract executes on the victim's behalf. Real assets — ETH, ERC-20 tokens, NFTs — are transferred to attacker-controlled addresses. The victim has no further action required from them.
Repeat
~90 Second Cycle. The operator wallet calls the phishing contract every 90 seconds continuously, distributing bait to new batches of addresses. 85,440+ transactions in 55 days.

IV. Scale Analysis

Data sourced from Dune Analytics (Query 7661222, executed 2026-06-05). Sample: 20 transactions from the 7-day window ending June 5.

85,445+
Total Transactions
55
Days Active
~1,553
Tx / Day (avg)
~90s
Fire Interval

Token Distribution (7-day Sample, 20 tx)

TokenContractUnique RecipientsTransfer CountExtrapolated Targets
USDT 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7 929 1,045 ~3.9M
USDC 0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48 641 728 ~2.7M
WBTC 0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599 5 5 ~21k
LINK 0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca 3 3 ~12k
DAI 0x6b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f 3 3 ~12k

Extrapolation: sample rate scaled linearly against 85,445 total transactions. Actual victim count depends on interaction rate per recipient.

V. On-Chain Evidence

Dune Query — Transaction History
Query ID: 7661202 · Execution: 01KTC0HFKTV32MXMNEXKBDG1X2
Source: ethereum.transactions WHERE "from" = 0xbad00000...
Result: Confirmed 85,445+ transactions, nonce sequence, 90-second fire pattern
Dune Query — Token Flow (ERC-20 Transfer Events)
Query ID: 7661222 · Execution: 01KTC0PMM1QTF1RFW9XMFQGG0D
Source: ethereum.logs WHERE topic0 = 0xddf252ad... AND contract_address IN (USDT, USDC, WBTC, LINK, DAI)
Result: 9 token types, 929 USDT recipients, 641 USDC recipients in 7-day window
Note: ERC-20 Transfer event signature lives in topic0, not topic1. topic1 = indexed from address.
Etherscan Labels (Public)
0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 → Fake_Phishing2738812
0xbbbbb048b1a85ca221058c45525095b6a68bbbbb → Fake_Phishing2738521
0x38a4610d346b7f63319bc054f22f606317d3fc59 → Fake_Phishing2738522
HashDit flag confirmed on phishing contract.
Contract Bytecode Analysis
Contract: 0xbbbbb048b1a85ca221058c45525095b6a68bbbbb
Size: 778 bytes · Unverified · Obfuscated
allowedCaller() function: returns 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472
Confirms operator controls contract with full authority.
RPC Verification (ethereum.publicnode.com)
Operator balance: 5.28 ETH (gas reserve, not victim funds)
Operator nonce: 85,440+ — consistent with 55-day automated operation
Contract type: EOA (private key controlled) — confirmed by outgoing transactions
First active: 2026-04-11

VI. Operator Key — Vulnerability Assessment

The operator address 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 carries an 8-character vanity prefix (bad00000). Vanity addresses require generating billions of key pairs — this is only feasible with a GPU-accelerated tool.

CVE-2022-40769 — Profanity Weak RNG
Tooljohguse/profanity (and forks including cenut/vanity-eth-gpu)
Vulnerabilitystd::random_device → mt19937_64 seeded with 32-bit value
Effective seed space2³² = 4,294,967,296 possibilities
Confirmed 2^32YES — std::random_device on Linux returns unsigned int (32-bit). Self-test passed: seed=42 → address derivation → crack found seed=42 in <1ms.
GPU crack time<1 hour on modern hardware
CPU crack time~60 hours on 8-core EPYC (20k seeds/sec)
Disclosed1inch blog, September 2022
Risk factorAddress created April 2026 — if using original Profanity (not Profanity2), key is recoverable

Proof of Concept — Algorithm Verification

# MT19937-64 seed → private key → Ethereum address
# Matching std::mt19937_64(seed) exactly

def mt_gen4(seed32):
    # Initialize 312-element state (matches C++ constructor)
    mt = [seed32]
    for i in range(1, 312):
        mt.append((6364136223846793005 * (mt[-1] ^ (mt[-1] >> 62)) + i) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
    # Twist + temper → 4 × uint64 = 256-bit private key
    ...

# Self-test result (executed 2026-06-05 on VPS):
# seed=42 → address=0xfad2143f79993fdd58645d72c12ce7913f049eda
# Scan seeds 0–99 → FOUND at seed=42 ✓
# Algorithm confirmed correct. 2^32 confirmed as full keyspace.

Active Crack Status

PM2 77 — profanity-scan-bad00000 — RUNNING
Host: RED VPS 62.171.153.214
Target prefix: bad00000
Speed: ~20,000 seeds/sec (8 workers, AMD EPYC)
Seed range: 0 → 4,294,967,296
ETA: ~60 hours from start (2026-06-05 16:30 WAT)
Result path: /root/profanity_result_bad00000.json
Alert: SELUTH mailbox + Telegram on success

What Happens If Key Is Recovered

Step 1
Import. Private key imported to offline secure wallet. Operator address is now under white-hat control.
Step 2
Disrupt. Operator ETH (5.28 ETH) swept to escrow. bbbbb phishing contract loses its authorized caller — operation stops.
Step 3
Report. Full evidence package submitted to FBI IC3, FTC, Etherscan, ChainAbuse, HashDit.
Step 4
Distribute. White Hat Protocol: 80% victim compensation via claim portal · 10% operator fee · 5% escrow · 5% charity.

VII. Reporting Targets

PlatformURLSubmission TypeStatus
FBI IC3ic3.govInternet crime complaint — financial fraud, active networkPending
FTCreportfraud.ftc.govConsumer fraud reportPending
ChainAbusechainabuse.comReport all 4 addresses + evidence hashPending
Etherscanetherscan.io/address/...Abuse report — remaining unflagged addressesPending
HashDithashdit.ioUpdated evidence — bbbbb already flagged, add bad00000 operatorPending
Immunefiimmunefi.comProfanity CVE-2022-40769 in active criminal context — novel anglePending

VIII. White Hat Distribution Protocol

Established S48, Concept 418. Applies to all recovered funds from this operation.

80%
Victim Compensation
10%
Operator Fee
5%
Escrow / Ops
5%
Charity

Victim claims via team.route.sessionapp.org. Claimants must sign a message with a separate key proving ownership of the original wallet. 90-day claim window before any other disposition of unclaimed funds.

IX. Technical Appendix

EIP-7702 Reference

EIP-7702 (included in Pectra upgrade, 2025) allows EOAs to temporarily delegate control to a smart contract by signing a special authorization tuple. The authorization is embedded in a new transaction type (type 4). When a victim signs such an authorization — even unknowingly, via a misleading UI — the designated contract can execute arbitrary code on behalf of the EOA, including transferring all assets.

This is distinct from ERC-20 approve/transferFrom because it operates at the EOA level, not the token level. A single EIP-7702 authorization can drain ETH and all tokens simultaneously.

Dune SQL Dead End — topic0 vs topic1

-- WRONG (3 queries returned 0 rows):
WHERE l.topic1 = 0xddf252ad...  -- topic1 = indexed FROM address, not event sig

-- CORRECT:
WHERE l.topic0 = 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
-- topic0 = keccak256("Transfer(address,address,uint256)") = ERC-20 event signature
-- topic1 = indexed FROM address
-- topic2 = indexed TO address

Working RPC Endpoint

https://ethereum.publicnode.com
# ankr.com: API key required (broken 2026-06)
# eth.llamarpc.com: silent failures from VPS
# publicnode: confirmed working for eth_getBalance, eth_getTransactionCount, eth_getCode
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