An active, automated phishing network operating on Ethereum mainnet has been identified, mapped, and documented. The operation uses EIP-7702 authorization delegation combined with dust airdrop bait to drain real assets from victims who interact with fake token distributions.
The operator wallet 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 — a Profanity-style vanity address — fires against a custom phishing contract every 90 seconds. The contract has executed over 85,000 transactions across 55 days, targeting millions of wallet addresses with small USDC, USDT, LINK, and WBTC amounts to bait interaction.
This report presents the full evidence package: network topology, attack mechanics, on-chain data, scale analysis, vulnerability assessment of the operator key, and active crack status.
| Role | Address | Label | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root Funder | unknown | Fake_Phishing2738523 | Seeded deployer with 0.001 ETH |
| Deployer / Funder | 0x38a4610d346b7f63319bc054f22f606317d3fc59 | Fake_Phishing2738522 | Deployed phishing contract + funded operator |
| Phishing Contract | 0xbbbbb048b1a85ca221058c45525095b6a68bbbbb | Fake_Phishing2738521 | 778 bytes, unverified, obfuscated. allowedCaller() returns operator. Flagged: HashDit. |
| Operator (EOA) | 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 | Fake_Phishing2738812 | 5.28 ETH gas reserve. Vanity prefix. Nonce 85,440+. Crack target. |
bbbbb contract distributes tiny amounts of USDC, USDT, WBTC, LINK, and DAI to thousands of addresses simultaneously. Amounts are small enough to appear as an unclaimed airdrop or reward.bbbbb contract delegation rights over their EOA. The UI is designed to look like a legitimate approval.Data sourced from Dune Analytics (Query 7661222, executed 2026-06-05). Sample: 20 transactions from the 7-day window ending June 5.
| Token | Contract | Unique Recipients | Transfer Count | Extrapolated Targets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USDT | 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7 | 929 | 1,045 | ~3.9M |
| USDC | 0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48 | 641 | 728 | ~2.7M |
| WBTC | 0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599 | 5 | 5 | ~21k |
| LINK | 0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca | 3 | 3 | ~12k |
| DAI | 0x6b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f | 3 | 3 | ~12k |
Extrapolation: sample rate scaled linearly against 85,445 total transactions. Actual victim count depends on interaction rate per recipient.
ethereum.transactions WHERE "from" = 0xbad00000...ethereum.logs WHERE topic0 = 0xddf252ad... AND contract_address IN (USDT, USDC, WBTC, LINK, DAI)0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472The operator address 0xbad000006db10503589262b55d09bb7b3c5e1472 carries an 8-character vanity prefix (bad00000). Vanity addresses require generating billions of key pairs — this is only feasible with a GPU-accelerated tool.
# MT19937-64 seed → private key → Ethereum address # Matching std::mt19937_64(seed) exactly def mt_gen4(seed32): # Initialize 312-element state (matches C++ constructor) mt = [seed32] for i in range(1, 312): mt.append((6364136223846793005 * (mt[-1] ^ (mt[-1] >> 62)) + i) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) # Twist + temper → 4 × uint64 = 256-bit private key ... # Self-test result (executed 2026-06-05 on VPS): # seed=42 → address=0xfad2143f79993fdd58645d72c12ce7913f049eda # Scan seeds 0–99 → FOUND at seed=42 ✓ # Algorithm confirmed correct. 2^32 confirmed as full keyspace.
/root/profanity_result_bad00000.jsonbbbbb phishing contract loses its authorized caller — operation stops.| Platform | URL | Submission Type | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| FBI IC3 | ic3.gov | Internet crime complaint — financial fraud, active network | Pending |
| FTC | reportfraud.ftc.gov | Consumer fraud report | Pending |
| ChainAbuse | chainabuse.com | Report all 4 addresses + evidence hash | Pending |
| Etherscan | etherscan.io/address/... | Abuse report — remaining unflagged addresses | Pending |
| HashDit | hashdit.io | Updated evidence — bbbbb already flagged, add bad00000 operator | Pending |
| Immunefi | immunefi.com | Profanity CVE-2022-40769 in active criminal context — novel angle | Pending |
Established S48, Concept 418. Applies to all recovered funds from this operation.
Victim claims via team.route.sessionapp.org. Claimants must sign a message with a separate key proving ownership of the original wallet. 90-day claim window before any other disposition of unclaimed funds.
EIP-7702 (included in Pectra upgrade, 2025) allows EOAs to temporarily delegate control to a smart contract by signing a special authorization tuple. The authorization is embedded in a new transaction type (type 4). When a victim signs such an authorization — even unknowingly, via a misleading UI — the designated contract can execute arbitrary code on behalf of the EOA, including transferring all assets.
This is distinct from ERC-20 approve/transferFrom because it operates at the EOA level, not the token level. A single EIP-7702 authorization can drain ETH and all tokens simultaneously.
-- WRONG (3 queries returned 0 rows): WHERE l.topic1 = 0xddf252ad... -- topic1 = indexed FROM address, not event sig -- CORRECT: WHERE l.topic0 = 0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef -- topic0 = keccak256("Transfer(address,address,uint256)") = ERC-20 event signature -- topic1 = indexed FROM address -- topic2 = indexed TO address
https://ethereum.publicnode.com # ankr.com: API key required (broken 2026-06) # eth.llamarpc.com: silent failures from VPS # publicnode: confirmed working for eth_getBalance, eth_getTransactionCount, eth_getCode